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We used to speak accurately of the Internet, a single logical network of entities only a 
click away from each other, no matter how distant in physical space.  That was certainly 
the ambitious intention of those who designed it; they sought to integrate lots of existing 
little networks, running on a variety of physical media, into a coherent whole. 
 
They succeeded, and the resulting network and corresponding protocols absorbed almost 
every other more localized or proprietized network design effort.   A globalized Internet 
running on open protocols meant that users could disregard both their own physical 
location and that of anyone they traded bits with; an occasional slow-to-respond (even 
while lightly-trafficked) Web site might be the only betrayal of physical distance online 
for the average user.  Web site operators, in turn, embraced the idea that setting up a 
single site would expose its contents to the entire Net-connected populace, wherever it 
might be geographically found. 
 
This cherished fact of Internet life promptly spawned a complementary set of problems 
loosely categorized as “jurisdictional.”  At their core lay the fact that perceived serious 
harm – to one’s reputation, digital property, peace of mind, or computer network – could 
now easily originate at a distance and follow a path in between accuser and accused that 
traversed the physical territories of any number of sovereigns.  As Internet usage has 
gone mainstream, the problems arising from harm-at-a-distance have intensified in 
tandem with the ranks of those feeling injury.  Individuals complaining of libel or fraud 
are joined by corporations worried about stock manipulation and domain name 
cybersquatting, as well as governments anxious about citizens purchasing faraway goods 
effectively exempt from sales tax, and encountering illegal speech that is not nearly as 
easily controlled as that issuing from print or broadcast media.  Part II of this book 
features essays that touch on each of these problems, some from the perspectives of those 
threatened by the Net’s global character, others from the perspectives of those threatened 
by actions to redress it, such as surfers subjected to Web site filtering by governments. 
 
In this chapter I will explain two tectonic shifts in Internet architecture that are changing 
the ways in which these problems are addressed, and that together are likely to make 
them largely evaporate.  These shifts will help ease the tension between the certitudes 
that the Internet is global, while the imposition of regulation is almost always local.  
These cures for the longstanding dilemmas of Internet jurisdiction and governance 
eliminate the originally cherished aspects of a global Internet as well – urging us to 
consider the iatrogenic effects of bulldozing online activity to conform more to the 
boundaries of the physical world that preceded it, and explaining why, in the United 
States and elsewhere, there are contradictory policies emerging about the Internet’s 
future. 
 
                                                 
† Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Assistant Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard Law 
School.     Zittrain - Jurisdiction  2 
As the kaleidoscopic sweep of topics within this book shows, the governance of behavior 
on the Internet is a broad topic with meanings that vary by context.  All are linked by the 
global Internet/local law dichotomy.  To understand evolving solutions to these issues, it 
helps to break down the topic along lines that have represented the most persistent 
problems: determining the proper scope of a well-meaning sovereign’s reach over a 
physically absent accused wrongdoer; reconciling multiple jurisdictions’ laws that could 
be said to touch on a single Internet act; and enforcing whatever judgments are thought 
proper to make. 
 
A. Personal jurisdiction: How far should a government want its legal 
reach to extend? 
 
The early puzzles of Internet jurisdiction invariably began with a chestnut focusing on the 
location of data rather than people.  Thinkers were naturally intrigued by the prospect of 
Internet data bouncing all over the place from one point to another, such as: 
 
A, in Austria, sends a threat by email to C, who retrieves the email from America Online's 
computers in Virginia and reads it on her screen in California.  The packets making up the email 
traveled by way of Great Britain before reaching the United States.  Where has the threat 
“happened”?  Can California prosecute A?  Can Virginia?  Where can C sue?  Does Great 
Britain care? 
 
Analysts thinking of this as a new and distinctly Internet-related problem were not much 
deterred by the fact that such hypotheticals could be constructed without any reference to 
the Internet – one need only imagine the threat being carried by international post or 
telephone – and that a world comprising hundreds of distinct (and at times contradictory) 
legal systems had managed not to lapse into legal crisis because of them.  Perhaps those 
analysts thought that the Internet made formerly rare scenarios routine and reasoned that 
a difference in degree can become a difference in kind.  Whatever the explanation, the 
first jurisdictional puzzles were often based on the remarkable fact that Internet 
technology contemplated the movement of data to any number of physical locations at 
any moment, a technicality that Internet users might not bear in mind when sending an 
email to a next door neighbor. 
 
Of course, the practical answer in the international arena has been clear long before the 
Internet: C can sue (and A can be prosecuted) wherever a jurisdiction decides it cares to 
exercise its power – and can realistically make the defendant’s life worse for failing to 
show up to contest the case, or for showing up and losing.  Many jurisdictions choose to 
limit their decisions on exercising power on yet further factors; they may require some 
contact by the absent defendant (perhaps other than the very behavior complained of) 
before agreeing that “personal jurisdiction” exists, or they may decide that the dispute 
itself must touch on that physical jurisdiction in a way that makes it especially competent 
to locate a tribunal there (a form of “subject matter” jurisdiction). 
 
These are useful limits to self-impose, lest a sovereign find itself enmeshed in disputes 
and prosecutions thanks to the mere fact that data relating to the dispute – at base,     Zittrain - Jurisdiction  3 
electrical impulses – transited that sovereign’s geographic territory.  This may explain 
why, over time, analyses regarding which countries and governmental subdivisions ought 
to become involved in a dispute have relied less on the facts about where data might be 
located or found in transit, and more on the behavior itself complained of, and the 
physical location of the parties engaging in it. 
 
Exceptions still exist where the movement or location of bits alone has been found to 
matter, generally where a sovereign makes it an ideologically high priority to become 
involved, or where cross-jurisdictional situations are themselves a substantive 
enhancement to a local crime or tort.  In one United States case, for example, a 
Worthington, Ohio man was prosecuted for illegally importing obscenity into the state 
because he used America Online to send an email to a minor also in Worthington, Ohio.  
The Ohio Supreme Court found the movement of bits from the man’s computer in Ohio 
to America Online’s computer in Virginia and back to the minor’s computer in Ohio to 
be an importation.
1 
 
When passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,
2 allowing trademark 
holders to sue domain name registrants whose domain names are claimed to infringe the 
holders’ marks, the U.S. Congress provided that in those instances where the defendant 
was overseas or unknown, an in rem action could be brought against the name itself – 
which, if it has any location at all, reposes as data on certain computers that index domain 
names.
3  As a result, the in rem provisions allow suit wherever the registrar or registry for 
the name is located.  In the case of .com names, that means that a Federal court in 
Virginia is available to would-be plaintiffs under the Act, since the company running the 
.com registry is located there.
4  Thus an Austrian registering a name like 
goodvacations.com for use in Austria might have to answer to an American court if a 
claim of trademark infringement arises, with theories of jurisdiction resting on the thin 
reed of the fact that the data management behind the domain name takes place in the 
United States. 
 
Again, these examples are the exceptions.  Jurisdiction based on the movement of bits 
alone has typically proven too expansive for sovereigns to routinely recognize it.  As 
demonstrated by the use of the in rem provisions only as a backstop should the defendant 
be otherwise unreachable, there are usually other paths to asserting both personal power 
over a defendant and a subject matter interest in a case.  When those paths are lacking, 
chances are good that the transit of bits will not and should not interest a sovereign – 
except in cases where a sovereign already has practical enforcement power over a 
defendant and is satisfied with the slimmest of procedural pretexts to claim the right to 
intervene.  The long-term storage of bits in a particular physical location might trigger 
interest by a government with power over that location, but so long as the storage is not 
inadvertent or uncontrollable by whatever entity is the source of the data in question, 
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would-be defendants can choose to store data in the most hospitable physical legal 
environment – while still having it available worldwide through the Internet. 
 
The existence of the so-called Principality of Sealand brings this into perfect relief.  A 
cyberlaw textbook author’s dream, Sealand is an abandoned World War II anti-aircraft 
platform just off the coast of Great Britain.  A man named Roy Bates claimed it for his 
own in the mid-60’s, and cites the ambiguous outcome of some U.K. court battles over its 
ownership – and a failed invasion attempt by German nationals in the 70’s – as evidence 
that it is indeed a sovereign nation. 
 
5 
 
The most recent use to which Sealand has been put is as the home of a company called 
Havenco, which touts itself as providing “the world’s most secure managed servers in the 
world’s only true free market environment.”
6  If the storage of data alone were the anchor 
for the assertion of jurisdiction, data could simply be stored somewhere, such as on 
Sealand, that would be out of reach of the sovereigns that might have an interest in 
exercising jurisdiction.  Interestingly, Sealand and Havenco themselves ban the use of 
their servers to host child pornography – as defined by U.S. law – or to mount hacking or 
spamming activities.
7  This could simply reflect Prince Roy’s sense of right and wrong, 
but no doubt also results from the fact that Sealand itself must get its network 
connectivity somewhere – and could be at risk of losing it should its own Internet service 
providers reject its activities, or be pressured by nearby governments to do so.  Further, 
the benefits to a would-be defendant of safeguarding data there for jurisdictionally 
evasive purposes are limited by the defendant’s location.  Unless a person is willing to 
move to Sealand, he or she would still be within another sovereign’s physical and 
therefore legal reach and would thus risk being personally penalized should undesired 
activities taking place on Sealand under the defendant’s direction not cease, or sought-
after data secured there not be produced. 
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6 See http://www.havenco.com/. 
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This is why, while intriguing from an academic standpoint, the existence of Sealand 
doesn’t much change the nature of the jurisdiction and governance debates.  It’s less 
about where the bits themselves are, and more about where the people authoring them – 
and allegedly causing harm by them – are. 
 
As a government reflects on the proper limits of its reach against a faraway defendant 
whose Internet activities are causing local grief, it runs into a dilemma.  On the one hand, 
a plaintiff might claim it unfair that the sovereign would decline to intervene simply 
because a defendant is wholly absent, since the effects of the defendant’s Internet 
behavior are still felt locally. On the other hand, going on an “effects” test alone suggests 
that anyone posting information on the Internet is unduly open to nearly any sovereign’s 
jurisdiction, since that information could have an effect around the world.  Prof. Geist’s 
essay in this volume suggests a middle path, that of “targeting,” where something more 
than effects, but less than physical presence, could trigger jurisdiction.  That path tries to 
peel away many if not all extraneous governments from a scrum that could pile up around 
a single defendant’s objectionable behavior, while preserving the prospect that 
jurisdictions other than the defendant’s home could stake a legitimate claim to intervene.  
As with many middle paths, the devil lies in the details.  But especially in the midst of a 
sea change in the fundamental global Internet/local law dilemma – one where a more 
localized Internet is possible thanks to geolocation technologies – such a path seems the 
best compromise in an inherently difficult situation. 
 
The High Court of Australia’s decision in Gutnick v. Dow Jones
8 vindicates this kind of 
reasoning in a case that blends personal jurisdiction with choice of law.  There, an 
Australian businessman named Joseph Gutnick sued Dow Jones for an unflattering 
portrait of him published online in Barron’s.  Dow Jones asked the Australian legal 
system to decline to intervene, arguing that Dow Jones’s United States home was the 
fairest place to hear the dispute.  The Australian court was unpersuaded by the “pile on” 
argument that Gutnick could next sue the company in Zimbabwe, or Great Britain, or 
China.  It pointed out that Gutnick himself lived in Australia, and Dow Jones quite 
explicitly sold subscriptions to the online Barron’s to Australians.  These facts helped 
Australia escape the dilemma of justifying almost any country’s intervention if it was to 
justify its own.  Without its special if not unique relationship to one party in the case, 
Australia may well have declined to intervene in the dispute. 
 
Even as the pure issue of “personal jurisdiction” finds a messy lawyer’s compromise, 
when people or companies are far away from a sovereign’s physical territory – or 
anonymous, and therefore of unknown location – the sovereign’s quandaries more 
typically involve reconciling its laws with those of other governments that might 
similarly find a right to intervene, or bareknuckle enforcement of any decrees it enacts 
against a faraway party once it has assured itself of its right to intervene. 
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B. Choice of law: The slowest ship in the convoy problem 
 
In the spring of 2003 the New Yorker’s Seymour Hersh wrote an article about U.S. 
Pentagon advisor Richard Perle.
9  Perle was quoted in the New York Sun as saying that 
he planned to sue over the article, and in Great Britain at that, since the British libel laws 
were more generous to plaintiffs than those of the United States.
10  Suppose Perle spent a 
lot of time in Great Britain and had reputational interests there that were threatened by 
Hersh’s piece, and suppose further that the New Yorker sold online subscriptions to 
British readers?  A targeted effects test for personal jurisdiction might be met, but the 
defendant’s objections need not be grounded in a lack of authority of British courts to call 
it to account.  Rather, the New Yorker could claim that to have to hew to British law on 
the Internet would be an inappropriately all-or-nothing choice by the publisher.  For the 
online New Yorker to conform to British law would mean that Americans would be 
deprived of content otherwise protected by the First Amendment.  In essence, the global 
convoy of Internet publishers operating under respective countries’ motley laws would 
harmonize at those of the most restrictive major jurisdiction – the “slowest ship.”
11 
 
This problem is distinct from the legal nuances of personal jurisdiction, and has been 
raised in several other high profile disputes.  For example, Canadian firm iCraveTV 
sought to rebroadcast television signals over the Internet, a practice that was arguably 
legal in Canada at the time though illegal in the United States.  Broadcasters and others 
brought suit in the United States.
12  Personal jurisdiction was not at issue, since at least 
one relevant iCraveTV executive was an American citizen in residence in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, and the firm had an office there.
13  What made the case interesting was the 
prospect that the Canadian firm could be asked to cease transmitting entirely, so long as 
any Americans could view their online webcast feeds.  The case didn’t make it past the 
temporary restraining order phase – iCraveTV folded not long after it lost the first 
skirmish
14 – but it was clear from the transcripts of oral argument that the judge was not 
much impressed by the prospect that iCraveTV’s activities were legal in Canada, so long 
as there could be any American viewers of the site.
15  (The United States has long had an 
expansive view of its jurisdiction; just ask former Panamanian strongman Manuel 
Noriega.) 
 
At the state level within the United States, the “dormant commerce clause” of the 
Constitution is said to proscribe state laws whose effects reach beyond state borders, even 
if the target of regulation is legitimate within the state.  It was by way of this reasoning 
that a district court struck down a New York law asking Web site operators to ensure that 
                                                 
9 Seymour M. Hersh, Lunch with the Chairman, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 2003 (posted online on Mar. 
10, 2003), available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030317fa_fact. 
10 Adam Daifallah, Perle Suing Over New Yorker Article, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 12, 2003, at National 2. 
11 James C. Goodale, The Right Forum for Richard Perle, 229 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Apr. 4, 2003). 
12 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. et al. v. iCraveTV, Civ. Action No. 00-121 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000). 
13 See id. at ¶¶ 9-13. 
14 Motion Picture Association of America, iCraveTV Signs Settlement Agreement that Shuts Down 
Website, Feb. 28, 2000, available at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/iCrave_Settlement.htm. 
15 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. et al. v. iCraveTV, Civ. Action No. 00-121 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 
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indecent content could not be viewed by minors.
16  The court’s view was that every Web 
site operator in the country would be affected by such requirements since there was no 
easy way to know when a New York minor might stumble onto a given site and thereby 
bring its operator under the sway of New York’s law.
17  States are thus compelled to limit 
their lawmaking when an intervention affects parties outside the state who are otherwise 
operating under other ground rules, even as the Federal government is not held to a 
comparable standard vis-à-vis the international community.  This may be doctrinally 
inconsistent, but it’s perfectly understandable in the obvious absence of a unifying global 
legal structure. 
 
 
C. Enforcement 
 
Even if a country finds itself competent to hear a case and apply its law, enforcement of a 
resulting judgment can be difficult against a faraway party if the party has no significant 
in-country assets or interests.  Dow Jones’s claimed worries about answering for 
defamation in Zimbabwe
18 might ring hollow here; the practical dynamics of global 
jurisdiction suggest that a core group of powerful countries can call outsiders to account 
far more readily than smaller, obscure ones can.  There is some push to allow for more 
ready enforcement of judgments across international boundaries – converging slowly 
towards the idea of full faith and credit among nations as already exists among the 
American states – but where a given country’s public policy can be shown to conflict 
with a fellow sovereign’s judgment, the deal might not be honored.  When Yahoo! faced 
an order from a French court threatening damages unless Yahoo! took measures to 
preclude French citizens from viewing online auctions of Nazi memorabilia, it obtained a 
declaratory judgment from an American court indicating that any finding of damages 
there would not be enforced in the United States.
19 
 
The difficulties of extraterritorial enforcement can be particularly acute for countries like 
China.  The Chinese government has great sensitivity to Internet speech that is perceived 
to undermine state control, but cannot readily get countries playing host to the speech – 
and the speakers – to enforce adverse judgments or force a stop to the speech.  However, 
for those looking to do business in China, and thus with something to lose there, power 
can be brought to bear.  A number of overseas content and Internet service providers 
targeting Chinese audiences have joined hundreds of domestic companies in signing a 
“Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China Internet Industry” by which they agree, 
among other things, to refrain “from producing, posting or disseminating pernicious 
                                                 
16 American Library Association v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160 (SDNY 1997). 
17 969 F.Supp. 160 at 167. 
18  See Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Gutnick (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433, [2002] H.C.A. 56. 
19 Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme and L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France, 
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information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability, contravene 
laws and regulations and spread superstition and obscenity.”
20 
 
D. Global Internet, Global Law 
 
Each of the major problems of jurisdiction – personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
enforcement – is grounded in dilemmas arising from a global Internet cabined only by 
local laws.  Some attempts to eliminate the dilemmas have sought to simply make for 
global, rather than local, law.  This might be done in two general ways: making a sui 
generis, non-country-specific body of law or best practices applicable to Internet 
activities, or striving towards substantive harmonization among existing sovereigns’ laws 
– along with a common set of practices for personal jurisdiction and mutual enforcement 
of judgments. 
 
Creating Internet-specific law has been embraced, naturally, by Internet exceptionalists 
who want to see a cyberspace separate and apart from real space, and generally less 
regulated.  This was colorfully expressed in John Perry Barlow’s 1996 “Declaration of 
Independence for Cyberspace,” demanding that the industrialized nations of the world 
leave cyberspace alone, since it and its denizens were so unlike any physical world 
counterparts.
21  “We are forming our own Social Contract,” he wrote.  “This governance 
will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours.  Our world is different.” 
 
Others refined Barlow’s account by imagining not one social contract but many, a series 
of cyberspaces in which likeminded people could respectively gather.
22  All of these 
accounts are now thoroughly dated, premised on a digital divide between offline and 
online that less and less exists.  Instead of boasting an elite, libertarian demographic at 
variance with the mainstream populations of the industrialized world, the Internet is less a 
conceptually separate space with few direct links to non-Internet life and institutions, and 
more a ubiquitous tool.  So long as, say, someone can post messages to thousands of 
America Online subscribers claiming to be a person named Ken Zeran selling offensive 
T-shirts – providing the real, offline Ken Zeran’s telephone number as a lightning rod for 
irate calls – it is hard to call cyberspace separate, and its idiosyncrasies something with 
which “real” governments should not concern themselves.  Indeed, in the Zeran case,
23 an 
American law provided for immunities from liability for Internet publishers of others’ 
content without parallel immunities for their physical media counterparts.  This resulted 
in the strange situation of Zeran’s suit against America Online being categorically halted, 
while a suit against KRXO radio – whose disc jockeys had seen the message advertising 
                                                 
20 Digital Freedom Network, Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China Internet Industry, available at 
http://dfn.org/voices/china/selfdiscipline.htm. 
21 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Feb. 8, 1996, available at 
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
22 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367 (1996). 
23 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4
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the offensive T-shirts and conveyed it on-air to equally irate radio listeners – could go 
forward.
24 
 
Internet separatism lives on today primarily in debates about the application of state sales 
tax to out-of-state purchases made easy by the Internet.  Unless pitched as infant industry 
subsidization, it is hard to imagine reasons why Internet-based purchases should 
effectively avoid tax while purchases consummated in physical space do not.
25  The most 
direct account to explain the perspective of those who seek continuing moratoria on 
taxing Internet purchases is simply a hostility to government regulation in general and 
taxes specifically.  This is not an incoherent position; one might seek to prevent the 
“pristine” territory of the Net from being ruined by an encroachment of what one sees as 
irreversible overregulation in “real” space.  But from the point of view of the dilemmas of 
jurisdiction and governance, it trades in one set of fault lines – those between countries 
and other legal jurisdictions – for a new one, separating the physical and virtual worlds. 
 
The most effective – if not beloved – global law scheme has so far proven to be 
conveniently centered on cyberspace-specific disputes, namely those over domain names.  
As part of its designation by the U.S. Department of Commerce to manage global domain 
name policy, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers devised a 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for the adjudication of claims of improper 
registration of names in .com, .net, and .org.
26  Operating wholly independently from any 
one nation’s trademark laws, the UDRP neatly sidesteps many of the classic jurisdictional 
conundrums.  A faraway or unknown domain name registrant had better step forward to 
defend against a claim that his or her domain name infringes someone else’s rights, lest 
he or she lose the proceeding – and the name.  Enforcement is made easy since no money 
or behavioral change is asked of the losing respondent – the registry is simply notified of 
the panel’s decision and transfers control over the name to the complainant without any 
acquiescence required of the respondent.  The substantive principles under which UDRP 
cases are decided are vague, requiring an assessment of the “rights” and “interests” of 
both parties to the dispute without specifying just how those rights should be recognized 
or under what sovereign’s system.  But this has not stopped thousands of UDRP cases 
from going forward, and the adoption of the UDRP system by a number of additional 
registries operating other generic and country-specific top level domains. 
 
To be sure, use of the UDRP does not necessarily end legal wrangling – as mentioned, 
the U.S. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act provides its own mechanisms for 
seeking to complain about another’s domain name registration,
27 and any other number of 
trademark actions launched in countries willing to hear them could trump the UDRP’s 
                                                 
24 Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting, Inc., Nos. 98-6092 and 98-6094, Order and Judgment (10
th Cir. Jan. 28, 
2000). 
25 Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Taxing Internet Commerce, 
52 NAT’L TAX J. 413 (1999). 
26 ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy General Information, available at 
http://www.icann.org/udrp/. 
27 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (2003).     Zittrain - Jurisdiction  10 
result, whether for complainant or respondent.
28  Harold Feld’s chapter in this volume 
speaks to many shortcomings of ICANN and its UDRP, and highlights that a “universal” 
law orchestrated by a handful of staffers at a non-profit corporation may be far worse 
than the sometimes inconsistent regulation produced by more familiar territorial 
sovereigns, many of whom are run according to political principles that value and 
integrate individual voices and votes. 
 
Attempts to bind sovereigns’ laws substantively more closely together in a world with 
burgeoning transborder activity continue, and to the extent they succeed some of the 
structural jurisdictional tensions recede.  International treaties and agreements have 
begun to cluster, if not fully unify, countries’ practices on consumer protection, 
intellectual property, taxation, and to some extent, privacy.  But these shifts are 
incremental, and often the inking of a treaty – or even, within the European Union, the 
promulgation of a directive left for individual countries to implement – is only a starting 
point that tests individual countries’ and cultures’ mettle to actually enforce that which 
has been abstractly agreed to. 
 
 
E. Local Internet, Local Law 
 
The most intriguing developments in the running jurisdictional and governance debates 
have been those that point towards a reassertion of effective local government control 
over Internet usage of people within each government’s territorial boundaries. 
 
1.  Local control enabled by the source of content: The “check a box” solution 
 
The French courts have indicated an awareness of the convoy problem in the suit brought 
against Yahoo! for permitting online auctions featuring the display of Nazi memorabilia 
in claimed contravention of local law.  The outcome of that case so far has France 
asserting its right to demand that Yahoo! cease offering certain kinds of auctions, but 
only after the court chartered a three-expert panel to assess the extent to which Yahoo! 
could implement such a ban without having to apply it to non-French residents.
29  The 
panel concluded that Yahoo! was in a position to more or less determine who was 
accessing its auctions from France and who was not, and therefore could apply the 
strictures of French law to French customers without depriving, say, Americans the 
opportunity to browse auctions of Nazi material.  Firms have sprung up to offer just such 
geographic determinations, and while they are far from perfect, they can sort many users 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA and Desportos Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 01-
1197 (1
st Cir. Dec. 5, 2001). 
29 Interim Court Order, County Court of Paris, France, (Nov. 22, 2000) available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/001120yahoofrance.pdf (containing the Opinion of the Consultants 
Ben Laurie, Fançois Wallon and Vinton Cerf, La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme and 
L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France v. Yahoo!, Inc. and Yahoo France).     Zittrain - Jurisdiction  11 
into territories, and require those who wish to evade the categorization to undertake some 
burden and inconvenience to mask their geo-identities.
30 
 
Search engine Google, which offers country- and language-specific variants, apparently 
obeys the informal requests of officials from Germany to eliminate potentially illegal 
sites from its google.com counterpart at google.de.
31  So far Germany does not appear to 
have asked Google to eliminate such sites from those presented to German-based visitors 
to google.com, but the notion of geographic-specific information tailoring has lodged. 
 
Geolocation by online service providers is likely to become easier and more accurate 
over time.  Global positioning system chips are decreasing in price and finding their ways 
into laptops, and commercial opportunities exist to offer services on the basis of 
geography – one might soon be able to step off a plane, open a laptop or handheld 
personal digital assistant, and find an ad for local restaurants with automatic delivery 
displayed on the first sponsored Web site one visits.  To the extent geolocation is 
possible, the convoy problem described earlier in this chapter begins to melt away.  
Purveyors of information may object to the administrative burden of having to tailor 
information for multiple jurisdictions – just as opponents of nationwide collection of 
local state sales taxes in the U.S. point to the difficulties of mastering each state’s sales 
tax collection and remittance rules – but that complaint is much less searing and separate 
from the objection that one jurisdiction’s residents will be de facto subject to another’s 
laws because of a Web site’s all-or-nothing exposure to the Net’s masses. 
 
Many old-school Netizens, eager to maintain a global Internet unsusceptible to 
government control, were furious at their technologically savvy brethren for adverting to 
the possibility of geolocation in the Yahoo! France case.  This led to some perhaps-
chastened repudiation of the court’s decision by at least two members of the panel that 
enabled it, Internet pioneers Ben Laurie and Vint Cerf.  Laurie outright apologized, and 
Cerf was quoted after the decision as making the observation “that if every jurisdiction in 
the world insisted on some form of filtering for its particular geographic territory, the 
World Wide Web would stop functioning.”
32  That’s an overstatement in the sense that 
sources of content on the Web are perfectly able to tailor their information delivery on 
the basis of whatever demographic they can solicit or discern from those who surf their 
Web sites.  But it is completely accurate if one believes in “World Wide” as an 
affirmative ideological value for the Internet, rather than a technical description of its 
historically undifferentiated reach. 
 
One can imagine a framework for Internet content providers – whether large Web site 
operators or individual home page designers or message board posters – where prior to 
information going public, a set of checkboxes is presented where the publisher can 
indicate just where in the world the information is to be exposed.  One could check or 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Quova’s Geopoint, described at http://www.quova.com/services/geopoint.html. 
31 Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Localized Google search result exclusions, Oct. 2002, available 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google/. 
32 Mark Ward, Experts Question Yahoo Auction Ruling, BBC News, Nov. 29, 2000, available at 
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uncheck “United States” as a whole, or select specific states.  One could check or 
uncheck Zimbabwe, or Australia, or the European Union.  Such technological flexibility, 
combined with varied demands by countries for providers to filter content to hew to local 
laws, might induce risk-averse Internet content providers to adopt a very narrow band of 
publishing for their work – generally asking to limit distribution to those areas where 
legal risk is deemed low, or at least where potential profit from the work’s consumption 
there is thought to exceed such risk.
33  Users eager for information will then be 
effectively denied access to it by faraway content providers anticipating the actions of 
zealous local governments seeking to expand their local regulation of more traditional 
media into the formerly unregulable Internet space.  Worse, overcautious or simply 
indifferent Internet content providers will omit “unimportant” countries from the list of 
places able to view their offerings, enhancing a digital divide even though such countries 
are not explicitly seeking strong control over Internet content.  Indeed, the gleam of the 
World Wide Web would be dulled as it became simply another window into traditional 
content for many surfers, rather than a raucous digital free-for-all. 
 
Such a scenario is not inevitable, however.  Countries worried about being left off 
information providers’ checkbox list could pass safe harbor legislation providing for 
immunity as an enticement to content providers to allow them to remain on the list of 
digital destinations.  Or they might index their laws to those of countries that will rarely 
be omitted from checkbox lists – just as Sealand’s ban on the hosting of child 
pornography is a one sentence pointer to whatever the United States has legislated on the 
issue.  The search for “global law” might be given a strong push as countries seek to be 
clumped together in the minds of content providers. 
 
 
2.  Local control enabled near content’s destination: The Pennsylvania solution 
 
Even with the rise of technical abilities to filter the information one places on the Internet 
according to viewers’ locations, overseas sites may still balk at abiding by local 
governments’ demands for change.  Rather than writing off, say, Saudi Arabia as an 
Internet destination for fear of legal liability, an online newspaper might continue to 
make itself available there anyway – figuring that without in-country assets or other 
countries willing to enforce its judgments, there is little Saudi Arabia can do to call the 
newspaper to account.  The same reasoning may apply to individual message posters or 
bloggers wanting to protest China’s actions in Tibet, or fly-by-night pornographers and 
spammers who maintain no obvious central office or corporate staffs sensitive to 
international legal compliance. 
 
This may explain why some governments are focusing not on pressuring the sources of 
content around the world, but rather on controlling Internet service providers across 
                                                 
33 For an insightful expression of this concern, and an exploration of the theories by which a country should 
choose to enforce another’s judgment even if it would never endorse such a judgment when rendered 
locally in the first instance, see Molly S. Van Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the First 
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which data transits closer to home in an attempt to localize a Web surfer’s online 
experience. 
 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia and China both have comprehensive nationwide schemes by which 
Internet destinations deemed to run afoul of local law or convention are made unavailable 
to resident surfers. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, all Internet traffic in the country is routed through a proxy server at the 
country’s Internet Services Unit, the staff of which maintains a list of sites to be filtered, 
acting both to apply filtering criteria promulgated by the state and on specific filtering 
requests from individual state agencies.
34  The fact of filtering and some general 
descriptions of the criteria are available on the ISU’s web site,
35 and thousands of sites – 
including anonymizers and translators which might themselves be easy launching pads to 
otherwise-blocked sites – are blocked.
36 
 
In China, thousands of routers around the country are apparently configured to simply 
drop packets going to or from Internet points of presence that have earned a bad 
reputation with the authorities, and increasingly subtle forms of filtering – such as 
temporarily denying access to Google to those who run searches using sensitive 
keywords, like the name of president “Jiang Zemin” – can also be found.
37  Private 
companies offering Internet access in China have long done so on condition that they 
apply whatever filtering measures are asked of them by the state. 
 
Such filtering is far from perfect, but it can drastically increase a Net surfer’s burden to 
getting to desired information – especially when the absence of information may be 
subtle, as in a missing entry on a list of search results.  Peer-to-peer networks can seek to 
frustrate such attempts by implementing technologies such as “Publius”
38, but 
particularly when the act of using such technologies can itself be monitored and Net users 
can be punished in a distinctly non-virtual way, there exists a level of resources that a 
state can put into Internet filtering that tips the cat-and-mouse game in favor of the cat 
much if not most of the time. 
 
It’s no surprise that comparatively judicially isolated countries with censorship agendas 
unpopular on the international stage would turn to solutions applied close to home to 
create an Internet in keeping with local custom.  But such practices are starting to take 
root in other settings as well.  In the United States, the state of Pennsylvania passed a law 
allowing the state attorney general to call a Web page to the attention of a local judge.  If 
the judge finds probable cause that child pornography exists on that page, the attorney 
                                                 
34 See the Internet Services Unit’s homepage, available at http://www.isu.net.sa/index.htm. 
35 See the Internet Services Unit’s explanation of its Content Filtering practices, available at 
http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/content-filtering.htm. 
36 Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Documentation of Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia, Dec. 2002, 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia/. 
37 Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China, March 2003, 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/. 
38 Information on the Publius Censorship Resistant Publishing System is available at 
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general can demand that any Internet service provider with Pennsylvania customers make 
sure that the page is not visible to those customers.  There is only one documented 
instance of the Pennsylvania attorney general actually invoking the formal process to 
demand action by a local ISP;
39 the apparent threat of legal action alone is enough to 
make a system of informal notifications – and corresponding blocks – take place. 
 
Such a law reflects a clear tension in American thinking about localizing the Internet.  On 
one hand, Christopher Cox has introduced to the U.S. Congress the Global Internet 
Freedom Act, described in his chapter in this very volume.  It is a clarion call to make it 
the unabashed policy of America to maintain the Internet as a conveyor of information 
that repressive governments don’t want their subjects to see.  He sees the Internet as a 
precious conduit for the worldwide export of democratic ideas, and contemplates 
subsidizing technologies to route around local attempts at Internet censorship such as 
those described in this section.  Such attempts, of course, are the very ones that 
Pennsylvania – and now other Western states and countries – are beginning to undertake 
to bring the Internet into line with their respective laws. 
 
Straightforwardly argued from the accepted imposition of territorial regulation in 
physical space, attempts to localize the global Internet seem perfectly reasonable.  This is 
why Jack Goldsmith’s chapter of this volume is so compelling – he struggles to 
understand why the existence of the Internet poses any really new problems for 
jurisdiction and governance, and largely concludes that it doesn’t, or, but for enforcement 
difficulties, shouldn’t. 
 
Yet Post’s answer to Goldsmith resonates, too.  It recognizes that information is an 
atomic unit of a free society, and a medium that permits such extraordinary information 
access and manipulation by individuals so effortlessly across distances – as speakers, 
browsers, searchers, and consumers – is one that can be more than a new way of 
shopping, checking the weather, or watching traditional television at user-selected times. 
 
As the Internet becomes part of daily living rather than a place to visit, its rough edges 
are smoothed and its extremes tamed by sovereigns wanting to protect consumers, 
prevent network resource abuse, and eliminate speech deemed harmful.  The tools are 
now within reach to permit sovereigns with competing rulesets to play down their 
differences – whether by countenancing global privatization of some Internet governance 
issues through organizations like ICANN, coming to new international agreements on 
substance and procedure to reduce the friction caused by transborder data flows, or by a 
“live and let live” set of localization technologies to shape the Internet to suit the 
respective societies it touches. 
 
What we might gain in easing jurisdictional tensions we could stand to lose in 
revolutionary capacity.  The point of inflection at which the World Wide Internet sits 
                                                 
39 See September 17, 2002 Order of Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, In the 
Matter of the Application of D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
for an Order Requiring an Internet Service Provider to Remove or Disable Access to Child Pornography, 
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asks us to choose which we value more – international harmony and diversity that 
includes censorship smacking of repression, or an unavoidable baseline of freedom of 
expression that permits harmful speech along with constructive speech.  Can those who 
wish for civil liberty without child pornography and rampant copyright infringement have 
it both ways? 
 
Barlow wrote: “We cannot separate the air that chokes from the air upon which wings 
beat.”
40  But governments are likely to try.  The battles to watch, then, are not abstruse 
jurisdictional ones that Goldsmith rightly points out as more or less settled or stale 
whether on or off the Internet, but rather the dueling trajectories by which we embrace 
the Internet’s freedom and curse its anarchy, love its instantaneous, global scope and 
regret the refuge it offers to those who lie, cheat, and steal at a distance. 
 
                                                 
40 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Feb. 8, 1996, available at 
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 